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HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE,  
AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM 
 
Alexander Jackson 
 
ABSTRACT 
Arguments from “easy knowledge” are meant to refute a class of epistemological 
views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present 
arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other 
formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart 
Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s 
faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, 
the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic 
priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called 
lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic 
visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and 
Crispin Wright (2007). Finally I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-
formulated arguments from easy knowledge. 
 
 
1. ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE—AS I SEE THEM 
Arguments From Easy Knowledge are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, 
including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. Stewart Cohen (2002, 2005), 
Crispin Wright (2002, pp. 342–5; 2007, pp. 43–5) and Roger White (2006) present 
versions of the argument; James Pryor (2004, 2012, 2013) is among those trying to rebut 
it. This paper locates the best way to formulate arguments from easy knowledge, clearing 
up some mistakes in the literature. (I address only what Cohen calls the argument from 
“easy knowledge by deduction”, not his “bootstrapping” argument.1) Finally I present a 
new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge. 
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 This section presents arguments from easy knowledge as I see them. To my mind, 
these arguments must be framed using a notion of epistemic priority. Let’s have some 
cases of so-called “easy knowledge” on the table, starting with Cohen’s original example. 
 
 (RED LIGHTS) Stu goes to buy his son a red table. Stu sees a table in the shop, and 
comes to know by perception that it is red. He addresses the possibility that he is 
subject to a certain kind of error by reasoning: “The table is red; so it is not the 
case that the table is white with red lights shining on it.” 
 
(ALIENS) Janet lives in New York, and knows that she will be in Long Island 
tomorrow—she teaches a course there twice a week. She addresses an outlandish 
worry that she won’t make it tomorrow. She reasons: “I’ll teach in Long Island 
tomorrow; so I won’t be permanently abducted by purple aliens tonight.” 
 
(FALLACY) Sheila knows that if someone plays in the NFL then they are rich, and 
she knows that Mike is not rich. She competently deduces that Mike does not play 
in the NFL. She addresses the possibility that she inferred fallaciously as follows: 
“Mike does not play in the NFL; so it is not the case that I inferred fallaciously 
from true premises and he does play in the NFL.” 
 
In these cases, the subject infers that she is not mistaken, allegedly meeting the following 
three conditions. Firstly, the subject knows her premise is true. Secondly, the premise 
obviously entails the conclusion. But thirdly, the reasoning is illegitimate; it is rationally 
impermissible. The subject’s belief that she is not going wrong is labeled “easy 
knowledge” ironically. What’s important is that the reasoning is rationally defective; it 
strikes me as optional to say the reasoning fails to produce knowledge or justified belief. 
For example, I find it clear that Janet’s reasoning in ALIENS is illegitimate, but less 
obvious that she does not come to know that she won’t be permanently abducted by 
purple aliens tonight.2 Some philosophers try to explain away the intuition that the 
reasoning in question is illegitimate (including Pryor 2004, 2012, and Davies 2004); I am 
not convinced.3  
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I am going to talk about settling questions in particular ways.4 For example, visual 
perception, memory, and deductive inference are ways to settle questions. Settling that p 
is the same thing as judging that p, but I want to avoid the oddity of referring to “ways of 
judging”. Ways of settling a question can be ways to come to know, but need not be, as 
when forms a false or unjustified judgment. One can settle that p without first raising the 
question of whether p. Now let’s define: 
 
A “skeptical alternative” sk to S’s settling that p in way W is a proposition 
according to which it appears to S that p in the way characteristic of W, yet p is 
false.  
 
Arguments from easy knowledge take the following form, starting with a claim about 
an example like those set out above. 
 
SCHEMA FOR ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE 
(1) In example E,  
(a) S settles that p in way W; 
(b) S thereby knows that p; 
(c) sk is a skeptical alternative to S’s settling that p in way W, and hence p 
entails ~sk; but: 
(d) It is illegitimate for S to infer from p that ~sk. (premise) 
(2) In example E, S must settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p in way 
W. (inferred from (1), by IBE) 
(3) One must always settle that a given skeptical alternative does not obtain 
epistemically prior to settling a question in way W. (inferred from (2)) 
 
(2) is meant to be the best explanation for why (1) is true. In ALIENS, Janet’s inference 
is allegedly illegitimate because she must settle that she won’t be permanently abducted 
by purple aliens tonight epistemically prior to settling (in the normal way) that she’ll 
teach in Long Island tomorrow. It seems little more than common sense to say that in a 
crucial sense, Janet has to settle first that she won’t be permanently abducted by purple 
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aliens tonight. Similarly, Stu’s reasoning in RED LIGHTS is allegedly defective because Stu 
must settle that his conclusion is true epistemically prior to settling that his premise is 
true.  
Let me spend five paragraphs explaining how I understand epistemic priority. In 
my view, we are talking about a distinctive kind of epistemic rationality constraint, an 
example of which is that Janet’s reasoning is rationally forbidden. More carefully: some 
occurrent mental states and processes count as “settling that p epistemically prior to 
settling that q”, some as failing to do so, and some as neither (such as when one settles 
neither p nor q). That categorization makes a mental state or process rationally 
permissible or not, in a particular respect. Take, for example, a case of “easy knowledge”. 
Reasoning from p to ~sk counts as: failing to settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling 
that p; doing so is allegedly rationally impermissible. This prohibition is not a matter of 
the connection between premise and conclusion being too weak—one should believe that 
if p then ~sk. So epistemic priority requirements are distinct from rational requirements 
that one’s premises sufficiently strongly support one’s conclusions. 
When “easy knowledge” is forbidden, it is also forbidden to: judge that p and 
suspend judgment on whether sk. The forbidden combination counts as: failing to settle 
that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p.5 By contrast, it is not forbidden to: judge 
that p while ignoring the question of whether sk. For example, there is nothing wrong 
with Janet judging that she will teach tomorrow while ignoring the question of whether 
she will be abducted by purple aliens tonight. So that does not count as: failing to settle 
that she won’t be permanently abducted by purple aliens tonight epistemically prior to 
settling that she will teach on tomorrow. That is, Janet must settle that she won’t be 
permanently abducted by aliens tonight epistemically prior to settling that she will teach 
on tomorrow; but that does not entail that Janet must actually consider the outlandish 
worry in order to rationally judge that she will teach in Long Island tomorrow. The 
epistemic priority requirement only kicks in if Janet actually considers the skeptical 
alternative. This is a just a terminological stipulation about how to use the expression “S 
must settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p”. We could instead always say, 
“If S considers whether sk, then S must settle…” But these sentences are complicated 
enough as it is.6 
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Careful statements about epistemic priority specify the ways in which the 
questions are settled. Suppose Tanya has two ways to settle that Albany is the capital of 
New York State: she remembers it is, and she also reads it in an atlas (cf. Cohen 1999, 
pp. 74–6). Tanya must settle that the sentence in the atlas is not misprint epistemically 
prior to settling that Albany is the capital on the basis of the report in the atlas. But 
Tanya must settle that Albany is the capital epistemically prior to settling that the 
sentence in the atlas is not misprint by inference from the fact that the sentence is true. 
On my approach, talk of “epistemic priority” is just a way of talking about a 
cluster of rational prohibitions on mental states and processes. This conception stays as 
close as possible to the apparent phenomena, taking on the least amount of theoretical 
baggage. For example, the intuition is that Stu’s reasoning in RED LIGHTS is rationally 
defective; saying it violates an epistemic priority requirement simply places the relevant 
prohibition in a cluster of prohibitions (e.g., against Stu’s judging that the table is red 
while suspending judgment on whether it is white and illuminated by red lights). By 
contrast, the characterizations of epistemic priority in the literature take on controversial 
theoretical commitments. For example, Crispin Wright (2002, 2004, 2007) says that in 
the cases at issue, the subject’s “warrant” for the premise “fails to transmit” to the 
conclusion. “Warrants” are a generalization from propositional justifications. Many 
theorists will find it foreign to take warrants to be the fundamental epistemic notion, in 
terms of which other epistemic notions are to be understood. We should not assume that 
epistemic priority constraints can only be understood by taking warrants as the basic unit 
of epistemological theorizing. I’d go further: I find it natural to take the impermissibility 
of certain inferences to be the basic phenomena, not something involving “warrants”. 
James Pryor (2004) also characterizes epistemic priority in terms of propositional 
justification. Moreover, he gives a definition of epistemic priority that should be 
controversial. He defines “your justification to believe p needs to be antecedent to your 
justification to believe q” to mean that: “the conditions that make you have that … 
justification [to believe that q] include your having this justification to believe p.” (Pryor 
2004, p. 354, sentence-letters changed). I see this supposed definition as proposing a 
controversial explanation for the irrationality of certain inferences, whereas I think we 
should start by simply labeling the relevant kind of prohibition. It isn’t obvious that the 
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metaphysical order of explanation for the positive epistemic status of certain beliefs 
should give rise to rational prohibitions of the kind we are considering. (Let me illustrate 
why Pryor’s definition is controversial. This will involve jumping ahead of ourselves; I 
hope you will forgive my doing so within the safety of some parentheses. In § 6 I suggest 
that one can settle that ~sk at the same point epistemically speaking as one settles that p. 
In such a case, one does not settle one question epistemically prior to the other. Pryor’s 
definition then rules out the view that: one is justified in believing that ~sk partly in 
virtue of being justified in believing that p. But that view strikes me as a worthy of 
consideration.) 
Let’s move on to the next step in an argument from easy knowledge. The 
inference from (2) to (3) takes the example at hand to be representative of a way to settle 
questions. For example, if RED LIGHTS is representative of visual perception, then one 
must always settle that one isn’t misled epistemically prior to settling a question by 
means of visual perception. In general, an argument from easy knowledge is meant to 
establish “conservatism” about a way to settle questions: 
 
Conservatism about a way W of settling questions says that (for all subjects S, 
propositions p, and skeptical alternatives sk to settling that p in way W): S must 
settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p in way W.7 
 
Liberalism about a way W of settling questions says that: conservatism about W is 
false. 
 
If conservatism about W is true, then that way to settle questions is not 
foundational. For foundationalism about W says that sometimes there is nothing one 
needs to settle epistemically prior to settling a question in way W; conservatism says that 
one must always settle that skeptical alternatives don’t obtain epistemically prior. 
Conservatism rules out other views too. Deductive inference is not a foundational way to 
settle questions, as any premises must be established first, but liberalism about it seems 
plausible. One kind of skeptical alternative to a deduced conclusion is that the premises 
are true but the inference is fallacious. (Another kind is that the conclusion is deduced 
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from a false premise.) So liberalism about deduction is true if sometimes, one need not 
settle that one isn’t inferring fallaciously epistemically prior to settling a question by 
deduction. An argument from easy knowledge using FALLACY purports to refute that 
liberal view. 
It is natural to formulate arguments from easy knowledge in terms of epistemic 
priority requirements. §§ 2–3 criticize Cohen’s attempts to do otherwise. § 4 warns 
against working with an example that’s infected with the so-called lottery puzzle, and 
applies the lesson to White’s discussion (2006). § 5 focuses on visual perception, 
examining the consequences for easy knowledge of distinguishing basic from non-basic 
visual contents. § 6 points to a possible objection to even the best-formulated arguments 
from easy knowledge. 
 
2. COHEN’S FORMULATION: KNOWING THAT ONE’S FACULTIES ARE RELIABLE 
This section criticizes a first aspect of Cohen’s formulation of arguments from easy 
knowledge. Cohen (2002, 2005) says an argument from easy knowledge concludes that 
KR is true of the relevant “knowledge source”. 
 
(KR) A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S [at time t], only 
if [at t] S knows K is reliable. 
 
He thinks the truth of KR explains why “easy knowledge” inferences are illegitimate. But 
there are cases in which it can’t. 
Suppose Jonny is at an open-air market. He knows that he is outside in good 
natural light. He knows that his color vision is a reliable source, and that his putative 
deductive reasoning is too. So he satisfies the requirements KR places on those two 
sources. He sees a red table, and he comes to know that the table is red by looking, while 
satisfying KR. But now Jonny considers whether the table is white and illuminated by red 
lights. He could have come to know that the table is not white and illuminated by red 
lights on the basis of his knowledge that the table is outside and illuminated by natural 
light;8 but he doesn’t. Instead, Jonny reasons that since the table is red, it is not white and 
illuminated by red lights.  
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Jonny’s reasoning is repugnant, and KR can’t explain why: Jonny meets the 
conditions KR places on forming knowledge by visual perception and deductive 
inference. By contrast, conservatism can explain why Jonny’s reasoning is repugnant. 
Conservatism about color judgments says that Jonny must settle that the table is not white 
and illuminated by red lights epistemically prior to settling that the table is red. Jonny’s 
reasoning violates this epistemic priority constraint, and so is irrational, says the 
conservative. 
Jonny’s reasoning is a paradigmatic case of repugnant “easy knowledge”. 
Conservatism can explain why it is repugnant, while KR cannot. Therefore conservatism 
is the better general explanation for why “easy knowledge” inferences from perceptual 
knowledge are illegitimate. Arguments from easy knowledge involve an inference to the 
best such explanation (the step from (1) to (2) in the schema I gave). So conservatism is a 
more plausible conclusion than KR to draw from this argument from easy knowledge. 
Examples like Jonny can be constructed for all ways of knowing, I suggest, and so 
conservatism is always the more plausible conclusion for arguments from easy 
knowledge.  
 
3. COHEN’S FORMULATION: USING A WILLIAMSON-STYLE CLOSURE PRINCIPLE 
Now let’s look at the role of various “closure” principles in arguments from easy 
knowledge. Cohen (2002, p. 312, but not 2005) endorses CK, and I approve. 
 
(CK) If S knows that P, and S knows that P entails Q, then S is in a position to 
know that Q. 
 
It is helpful to see that both liberals and conservatives should accept CK.9 If Stu knows 
his premise, then he is in a position to know his conclusion (~sk)—the question is how he 
can know it. Conservatives say that Stu must settle first that ~sk, and liberals disagree. 
Cohen (2005 but not 2002) endorses DC and uses it to formulate arguments from 
easy knowledge.  
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(DC) If S knows that P, and S competently deduces Q from P, then S knows that 
Q.  
 
Principles like DC have been popularized by Timothy Williamson (2000, p. 117). John 
Hawthorne has defended the following variant (Hawthorne 2004, p. 34). 
 
(DC*) If S knows that P, competently deduces that Q, and thereby comes to 
believe that Q, while retaining knowledge of P throughout, then S thereby comes 
to know that Q.  
 
Let me first explain why it is unhelpful to formulate arguments from easy knowledge 
using DC*, before turning to DC. The moral will be that there is no alternative to framing 
the issue in terms of epistemic priority requirements. 
 The problem with appealing to DC* is that RED LIGHTS and ALIENS are a prima 
facie counterexamples. Stu comes to believe that the table is not white and illuminated by 
red lights, by competent deduction from his knowledge that the table is red. On the face 
of it, DC* says that Stu thereby comes to know that the table is not white and illuminated 
by red lights. But (assuming Cohen’s gloss on the intuition) he can’t come to know in 
that way. Similarly, DC* seems to say that Janet comes to know that she won’t be 
permanently abducted by purple aliens tonight, by means of her repugnant inference. 
 I don’t insist here that DC* is false. One might defend DC* by saying the 
antecedent of DC* is not satisfied if S must settle that Q epistemically prior to settling 
that P. One might say that reasoning that violates the required epistemic priority of 
settling that Q cannot be “competent” deduction. Or one might say that engaging in 
reasoning that violates an epistemic priority requirement destroys knowledge of the 
premise, P. Thus the cases of Stu and Janet won’t be counterexamples to DC* properly 
interpreted. However, such interpretations of DC* will only imply that Stu’s reasoning 
produces knowledge under the assumption that his reasoning does not violate a 
requirement of epistemic priority. If DC* is true (as we are interpreting it) and Stu’s 
reasoning does not produce knowledge, then his reasoning violates the requirement to 
settle first that ~sk. That is, arguments from easy knowledge that invoke a defensible 
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interpretation of DC* establish a conclusion about the proper epistemic order of settling 
questions, namely conservatism. It is easier to make this clear by leaving DC* out of it. 
Cohen says, “The problem for [theories that deny KR] is that given [DC], the 
theory has to allow that [Stu’s] reasoning is acceptable” (2005, p. 418). Cohen rests his 
explanation of the role of DC there. He is naturally interpreted as making the argument 
discussed above, which invokes DC*. But let’s consider an alternative that really appeals 
to DC. Grant that Stu knows that the table is red, but cannot come to know that the table 
is not white and illuminated by red lights by competently deducing it. DC implies that 
when he has deduced it, Stu knows that ~sk (the table is not white and illuminated by red 
lights). Cohen’s intuition is that Stu does not come to know that ~sk by means of the 
inference; DC is compatible with this. Given DC, Stu knows that ~sk, but not by 
deducing it from his perceptual knowledge. Stu must know it in some other way—he 
must already have known it. This conclusion has a similar flavor to conservatism. Let me 
explain why I don’t think this is a helpful way to understand arguments from easy 
knowledge. 
Distinguish occurrent from dispositional knowledge (i.e., a good occurrent belief 
from a good dispositional one). If DC implies that Stu has occurrent knowledge that ~sk, 
then it implies that Stu forms the relevant occurrent belief in two ways—one of which is 
the way he comes to know, posited by DC, and the other being the illegitimate “easy 
knowledge” inference. But we can stipulate that Stu does not come to occurrently believe 
that ~sk in any way other than the repugnant inference. So if DC is interpreted as 
concerning occurrent knowing, then RED LIGHTS is a counter-example (given Cohen’s 
intuition that the repugnant inference does not produce knowledge).  
So let’s consider DC as a principle about dispositional knowing. That is, suppose 
DC implies that Stu has dispositional knowledge that ~sk, and that DC thus interpreted is 
true. This way of framing arguments from easy knowledge leaves it mysterious why Stu’s 
inference is illegitimate. The argument takes as a premise that Stu’s inference is bad, but 
it makes no attempt to diagnose why. Why on earth does DC* fail in this case? The 
existence of another way of knowing that ~sk does not explain why Stu cannot also know 
it by deducing it from his perceptual knowledge. By contrast, conservatism diagnoses 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at
American Philosphical Quarterly, published by University of Illinois Press. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://
www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/apq.html
? ?? 
why Stu’s reasoning is illegitimate: it violates an epistemic priority constraint. We’ve 
found no alternative to taking the truth of conservatism to be the central issue. 
(For what it’s worth, I think we should accept that RED LIGHTS and ALIENS are 
counter-examples to DC*. Moreover, DC* conflates issues that must be distinguished: 
the compelling principle CK, and controversial claims about the permissible order of 
settling questions. Wright 2002 draws this standard distinction.) 
 
4. DEFEATERS AND THE LOTTERY PUZZLE 
This section restricts the kind of example that can be used in an argument from easy 
knowledge. Liberalism about W says that sometimes, one need not settle that ~sk 
epistemically prior to settling that p in way W. Liberalism allows that sometimes, one 
does need to settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p in way W. The liberal 
about a way of settling questions can say that when there is reason to worry that one is 
deceived, one’s prima facie justification is defeated (e.g., Pryor 2000, p. 534). The liberal 
can say that in such cases, one must settle that the relevant skeptical alternative does not 
obtain epistemically prior to settling questions in the relevant way.  
For example, spell out RED LIGHTS so that we want to say that Stu can’t know the 
table is red just by looking from 10 yards, because for all he knows, the lighting is 
deceptive. Stu is in a basement store, and has already noted the use of a blue lightbulb in 
another corner. The liberal can accommodate this case, saying that Stu has beliefs that 
defeat his prima facie perceptual justification. Those defeating beliefs affect the epistemic 
order in which Stu is to settle questions. In this situation, Stu must settle that the table 
isn’t deceptively illuminated epistemically prior to settling by perception that the table is 
red. That’s an obligation he cannot discharge. 
Now suppose an employee tells Stu that the table is illuminated by a daylight-
mimicking bulb. Stu can now know that the table is red. It is still true that he must settle 
that the table isn’t deceptive illuminated epistemically prior to settling that it is red. But 
the employee’s testimony allows him to meet that requirement. So Stu can know that the 
table is red, but it impermissible for him to deduce that the table is not white and 
illuminated by red lights.  
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The moral is that whenever it is plausible that there is a defeater for the subject’s 
prima facie justification, the liberal can agree with the conservative that “easy 
knowledge” violates an epistemic priority requirement. So an argument from easy 
knowledge must employ a case in which the subject has no defeating beliefs. RED LIGHTS 
should not stipulate that Stu views a table in a basement shop, as the liberal can claim that 
Stu has reason to worry about deceptive lighting. Rather, RED LIGHTS should be a case in 
which Stu shops for a red table at an outdoor market in broad daylight. Stu’s reasoning 
remains repugnant.  
We need to beware here of the effects of the so-called “lottery puzzle”10 (Vogel 
1990, Hawthorne 2004). The lottery puzzle arises for most ways of settling questions 
(Hawthorne 2004, pp. 1–5). Considering the right alternative often causes us to reverse an 
initial attribution of knowledge. In ALIENS, for example, we initially agree that Janet 
knows know she will teach in Long Island tomorrow. But considering whether Janet’s old 
car will break down, or whether there will be grid-lock on the Long Island Expressway, 
typically causes us to change our minds—Janet doesn’t know she will teach in Long 
Island tomorrow.  
There’s no puzzle yet: it just seems that Janet doesn’t know she will teach in Long 
Island tomorrow. The puzzle arises when we generalize from the example at hand, 
realizing how susceptible we are to these shifts in our verdicts. Do people know very 
little, and we realize this when we consider a range of skeptical alternatives? (Call this 
the skeptical solution.) Do people know a lot, and we are wrong to reverse our knowledge 
ascriptions? (Call this the dogmatic solution.) Is there a third diagnosis, according to 
which the initial attribution and the subsequent reversal are both “correct”? 
Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and truth-relativism are theories of the 
third, “shifty” kind.11 (I hope the reader will forgive formulations that blur the 
distinctions between the three kinds of shifty theory.) 
A lottery puzzle can arise for ways of knowing for which liberalism is true. When 
liberals change their minds about whether the subject knows, they can say they changed 
their minds about whether the subject’s prima facie justification is defeated. For example, 
a liberal about color vision can say, “I was being sloppy earlier when I said that someone 
in a basement shop can know a table is red just by glancing from 10 yards: they know 
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that artificial lighting is sometimes deceptive, which defeats their perceptual prima facie 
justification.” Moreover, liberals about a way to settle questions can endorse a shifty 
response to the relevant instances of the lottery puzzle. Liberals who favor a shifty 
solution to the lottery puzzle will say that there has been a shift in the “correct” verdict as 
to whether the subject’s prima facie justification is defeated, that goes hand in hand with 
the shift in the “correct” verdict as to whether the subject knows.12  
The lottery puzzle is a problem for everyone. So it wouldn’t be fair to press the 
lottery puzzle about perception, say, and then complain that liberalism about perception 
has to choose between implausible dogmatism and skepticism. Maybe a shifty solution 
allows us to escape that dilemma; or maybe dogmatism or skepticism seem less 
implausible when you realize the full scope of the lottery puzzle. Let me explain why I 
think Roger White (2006, pp. 536–7) makes this unfair objection to liberalism. 
White attacks liberalism about visual knowledge that something is a hand. He 
asks us to suppose that Harry knows that 98% of the population has hands, 1% has 
prostheses instead, and 1% has mere stumps. Harry looks at the end of a stranger’s coat 
from 20 yards away. He can’t reason, “She has hands, so she does not have mere 
prostheses.” White alleges that liberalism must endorse this repugnant reasoning. That is 
not so. The liberal can say that Harry doesn’t know just by looking that the stranger has 
hands. That’s because Harry’s prima facie perceptual justification to believe that the 
things are hands is defeated by his statistical knowledge about prostheses. As a result, all 
Harry learns by looking is that the things look like hands, just as White asserts.13  
White responds to this maneuver as follows (2006, pp. 536–7). 
 
If this is the appropriate response to the experience when we happen to know 
these statistics [about the frequency of prostheses and stumps], I can’t see why it 
should be any different in an ordinary case. Our judgments should be governed 
largely by our best estimate of these statistics. 
 
That is: if the liberal retreats to a skeptical treatment of Harry, saying that his prima facie 
justification is defeated, then the liberal must give the same skeptical treatment of every 
putative case of perceptual justification.  
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But this is simply to press the lottery puzzle in the case of perceptual knowledge. 
Considering the statistics about prostheses shifts our intuitions and makes us deny that 
Harry knows he is looking at real hands. White presses us to draw a general moral, which 
implies that there is very little perceptual knowledge. Philosophers who favor a shifty 
solution to the lottery puzzle respond that the propriety of ascribing perceptual 
knowledge shifts according to whether the statistics about mistakes are being considered. 
Hence it is often proper to attribute lots of perceptual knowledge to people. Liberals 
about perception can endorse a shifty solution to the lottery puzzle. They will match the 
shifts in proper knowledge attributions with shifts in the propriety of claiming that a 
subject’s prima facie justification is undefeated. If a shifty solution to the lottery puzzle 
manages in general to steer between dogmatism and skepticism, then it does so here for 
the liberal too. And if a skeptical solution is correct, then the liberal can endorse that 
instead (assuming there are plenty of defeating beliefs to go round). Only the dogmatic 
solution to the lottery puzzle creates a problem for the liberal. For I suggested that the 
liberal should say that Harry doesn’t know that the stranger has hands, and the dogmatic 
solution says he does. So the dogmatic solution allows White to formulate his argument 
from easy knowledge against perceptual liberalism. But, I’ve argued, shifty or skeptical 
solutions to the lottery puzzle do not. 
 Conservatives can formulate arguments that take as a premise the dogmatic 
solution to the lottery puzzle. They can then claim—counter-intuitively—that Harry does 
know the stranger has hands, and press the question of why Harry can’t then deduce that 
they are not prostheses. But such arguments would be theoretically controversial, rather 
than intuitively compelling. Much better, I think, for arguments from easy knowledge to 
consider cases where the subject reasons from a premise they intuitively know. Are there 
any such cases? Are there cases of putative easy knowledge in which we still think the 
subject knows her premise (and lacks defeating beliefs), even when the case has been 
fully described?14 Yes—ALIENS is one such case. After she considers the possibility of 
abduction tonight by purple aliens, we still say that Janet knows she will teach in Long 
Island tomorrow. RED LIGHTS is another suitable case, once we specify that Stu looks at a 
red table outside in broad daylight. Even once we and Stu consider the possibility that the 
table is white and illuminated by red lights, we are happy to say that Stu knows the table 
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is red; but his inference is illegitimate. Again, I am usually happy to say that I know that 
Paris is the capital of France, and to affirm I am not misremembering that; but it still 
seems wrong to reason from the former to the latter. So there are examples that are not 
automatically afflicted by the lottery puzzle, and can be used to frame arguments from 
easy knowledge.  
 
5. BASIC AND NON-BASIC VISUAL CONTENTS 
The literature on easy knowledge tends to focus on arguments for conservatism about 
visual perception. As I will explain, it matters whether we should think of visual 
perception as a single way to settle questions, or several.    
Plausibly, vision consciously presents the contours and colors of facing surfaces 
differently from those features of non-facing surfaces, and the classification of objects as 
zebras or hands, say. Call the former “basic” visual contents, and the others “non-basic” 
visual contents.15 Susanna Siegel (2010) is amongst those who reject this distinction. If 
her Rich Content Thesis is true, says Siegel, “then in whatever way we can be in contact 
with a thing’s shape and color, we can likewise be in contact with other properties of the 
things we see, such as a thing’s being a hand (part of an animate body), its weighing 
down a hammock (a causal property), or its walking down the street carrying a dog.” 
(Siegel 2010, pp. 7–9)16 But consider how I represent the volume of the sofa I am looking 
at from across the room. Surely the way I am in contact with the facing surfaces of the 
sofa differs from the way I am in contact with its rear. I can see the front of the sofa, and 
can’t see the back of it.  Two different ways of representing surfaces are involved in 
representing the sofa’s occupation of space. 
Rather than getting bogged down in this dispute, let’s simply suppose for the sake of 
argument that we should distinguish basic from non-basic visual contents. Moreover, 
let’s suppose that the non-basic contents of a percept are “based on” its basic contents 
(e.g., Pryor 2000, pp. 538–9). I suggest that this basing is not a matter of how basic and 
non-basic contents are computed. It is not relevant whether there is top-down processing, 
in which a favored non-basic content has a causal impact on the favored basic content. 
What matters is that the two kinds of content are represented in different ways when they 
hit consciousness, allowing for different metacognitive responses to them. For instance, 
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one can wonder why one thinks someone is lying (is it their voice or their eyes?), in a 
way that one can’t wonder why one thinks a certain surface looks brown—it is not 
recognized as such on the basis of any other information. It may be challenging to spell 
out how non-basic contents are based on basic contents in a way that is compatible with 
current cognitive science, but let’s just suppose that this can be done. Then one can be a 
liberal or conservative about basic vision, and about non-basic vision. Officially, Pryor 
(2000, pp. 538–9) only defends liberalism about basic vision. What is shown by an 
example of easy knowledge depends on whether the premise is known by basic or non-
basic vision, and on the nature of the skeptical alternative. 
Suppose someone reasons, “Those things are hands, so they are not prostheses that 
are indistinguishable from hands at this distance.” The premise is a non-basic visual 
content, and the conclusion is the negation of a worry about the basing of that non-basic 
content on some unchallenged basic content. The repugnance of such reasoning may be a 
problem for liberalism about non-basic vision; but it is clearly not a problem for 
liberalism about basic vision. Even after eliminating interference from the lottery puzzle, 
White’s example does not touch liberalism about basic vision. 
 Does the distinction between basic and non-basic visual contents make a different 
to RED LIGHTS? That depends on whether classifying something as red is a non-basic 
visual content. Let’s consider an account according to which it is non-basic. I am not 
saying such an account is correct. I want to argue that if such an account is correct, then 
RED LIGHTS does not impugn liberalism about basic vision. 
 The account we’ll consider distinguishes “objective” and “phenomenal” color as 
follows (cf. Pollock and Oved 2005, esp. 329–331). When one judges a painted wall to be 
of a uniform color, there is a sense in which it looks lighter nearer the window. One 
represents the wall as taking different values of “phenomenal color”. On that basis, one 
classifies the wall as being of a certain uniform “objective” color.17 In RED LIGHTS, Stu 
uses a belief about the table’s objective color to rule out a worry about the basing of that 
belief on the table’s phenomenal color. So if Stu’s reasoning is repugnant, it looks like he 
must settle that the lighting is not deceptive epistemically prior to settling the table’s 
objective color on the basis of its phenomenal color. That is, an argument from easy 
knowledge that uses RED LIGHTS challenges liberalism about non-basic vision, not 
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liberalism about basic vision. (Or so it seems, assuming that redness is a non-basic visual 
content.) 
Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents also allows a more exciting 
epistemological point to be made. Crispin Wright allows that whether something is a 
zebra, a hand, or is red, are plausibly non-basic visual contents (2007, pp. 45–7). He 
assumes the point of such a view is to combine liberalism about basic contents and 
conservatism about non-basic contents. Such a combination is committed to Wright’s 
project of showing that conservatism does not entail skepticism. So Wright concludes 
that distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents does not make a big difference to 
the epistemology of perception (2007, p. 47). I deny that the point of distinguishing basic 
from non-basic visual contents is to combine liberalism about the former with 
conservatism about the latter. Rather, the distinction allows a more plausible liberal 
treatment of both kinds of content—assuming the kind of liberalism introduced in the 
next section, where I’ll explain the idea. 
 
6. A WAY FOR LIBERALISM TO RESIST ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE? 
Some arguments from easy knowledge avoid the pitfalls described in §§ 4–5. For 
example, suppose Vicky looks at a table and reasons, “There is a thusly-shaped surface 
over there; therefore it is not that case that: I am hallucinating and there is no surface 
there.” (Ignore lines of thought leading to a lottery puzzle….) It is plausible that Vicky 
knows her premise, and yet her reasoning is illegitimate. An argument from easy 
knowledge concludes that conservatism is true of basic visual perception. But as I explain 
in this final section, this conclusion does not follow. 
 I suggest that the liberal about basic perceptual knowledge can agree that Vicky’s 
reasoning is illegitmate. Rejecting easy knowledge means that one cannot settle that ~sk 
epistemically posterior to settling that p. The argument from easy knowledge infers that 
one must settle that ~sk epistemically prior to settling that p. That does not follow: maybe 
one must settle that p by perception, and that ~sk, at the same point epistemically 
speaking. Then easy knowledge is always illegitimate, but liberalism about perception is 
true. 
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There is some plausibility to the proposal. Suppose Vicky’s sensible twin Wanda 
has a particular perceptual belief, and addresses the worry that it results from a 
hallucination. She is in a dilemma, to which she either responds skeptically (suspending 
judgment on both questions), or anti-skeptically (forming two judgments). It sounds right 
that Wanda settles in one go that there is a thusly-shaped surface over there, and that no 
hallucination deceives her. Moreover, the idea of settling two questions at the same point 
has wider application: plausibly, one must settle that p, and that one knows that p, at the 
same point epistemically speaking.18 
Three observations. First, the proposal says that Vicky must settle that p and that 
~sk at the same point epistemically speaking. That does not entail there’s anything wrong 
with settling that p while not considering whether sk. We already saw this point for 
epistemic priority in § 1 (Janet can rationally judge that she will be in Long Island 
tomorrow while ignoring the question of alien abduction). In particular, children who 
lack the concept of hallucination are not thereby “failing” to settle that they aren’t 
hallucinating at the same point epistemically speaking as they settle matters by 
perception. They aren’t thinking in one of the ways the proposal rationally forbids. 
Second, the proposal does not resemble traditional coherentism. Coherentism says 
that two beliefs can inferentially support each other. By contrast, when one settles two 
matters at the same point epistemically speaking, neither belief inferentially supports the 
other. For example, one cannot reason in either direction between the claims that p, and 
that one knows that p.19 
Third, the strategy need not be equally plausible for all ways of settling questions. 
I am drawn to liberalism about propositional memory, for example, but conservatism 
about Janet’s knowledge of the future in ALIENS. So I’m inclined to think that it is 
impermissible (or psychologically impossible) for Janet to settle that she won’t be 
permanently abducted by purple aliens tonight, and that she will teach in Long Island 
tomorrow, at the same point epistemically speaking. 
 What must liberals about W do to make good on the proposed response to 
arguments from easy knowledge? I say that liberals must give a psychological account of 
how people settle that ~sk in the relevant cases. Doing so must plausibly count as settling 
that p and that ~sk at the same point epistemically speaking. I have not given the needed 
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psychological account here. (Jackson 2015 makes a proposal.) Without a detailed and 
plausible account, conservatives can sensibly deny that there is such a way of settling that 
one is not mistaken. If the argument of this paper is correct, this psychological question 
should be at the heart of future debates between liberals and conservatives. For, I suggest, 
it determines the fate of the only plausible way for liberals to resist arguments from easy 
knowledge. 
I close by returning to the issue raised at the end of § 5. I’ve suggested that one 
can settle that p and that ~sk at the same point epistemically speaking. I’ll now explain 
why this makes more plausible the combination of liberalism about both basic and non-
basic vision. My working example of basic visual content is that there’s a stripey thing 
there; the non-basic visual content based on it is that the thing is a zebra. My liberal about 
basic vision says that one must settle a basic visual matter (there’s a stripey thing) at the 
same point as one rejects a worry about it (I’m not hallucinating). My liberal about basic 
and non-basic vision can say that one must settle that one is not hallucinating 
epistemically prior to settling that those things are zebras. For liberalism about non-basic 
vision is true if there are skeptical alternatives to the basing of the non-basic content on 
unchallenged basic content which need not be ruled out epistemically prior. For example, 
maybe one must settle that one has not confused the appearance of zebras with that of 
giraffes at the same point epistemically speaking as one settles that those things are 
zebras. Then liberalism about non-basic vision would be true, even if one must settle that 
one is not hallucinating epistemically prior to settling that those things are zebras. 
So on my proposal, the liberal about both basic and non-basic vision can reject the 
reasoning, “That’s a zebra, so I am not merely hallucinating the presence of a stripey 
thing in a region of empty space.” By contrast, if the liberal about basic and non-basic 
vision allows easy knowledge from basic visual contents, then she is committed to 
endorsing the just-mentioned “easy knowledge”. For if one is to settle that one is not 
hallucinating epistemically posterior to settling the basic perceptual matter, then I see no 
complaint against a two-step transition that settles one is not hallucinating on the basis of 
a non-basic visual content.20 But this example of  “easy knowledge” is particularly hard 
to stomach. So liberalism about basic and non-basic vision is a lot more plausible if it 
endorses the suggestion of this section. 
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1 I am happy to bite the supposed bullet and endorse “bootstrapping” (Cohen 2002, 2005). I am 
not so insouciant about the kind of “easy knowledge” discussed in this paper. 
2 I go against Tucker’s conception of the issue (2010, p. 505) here. Another example: suppose 
someone reasons, “I have hands, therefore I am not a massively deceived Brain In a Vat (BIV).” 
The reasoning seems bad to me, but I’m not sure that the reasoner wouldn’t thereby come to 
know that she is not a massively deceived BIV. 
3 Pryor thinks Stu’s reasoning in RED LIGHTS is legitimate, and tries to explain away the contrary 
intuition as follows (2004, 2012). He observes that if one is unreasonably suspicious that one is a 
deceived, or that certain epistemologies of perception are correct, then one won’t be rationally 
able to form perceptual knowledge, and so the easy knowledge inference won’t be available. This 
fails to explain why philosophers who harbor no such unreasonable suspicions (and who consider 
subjects who don’t either) still find easy knowledge repulsive. Davies (2004) claims that if one is 
trying to “settle the question” of whether one is deceived, one cannot form easy knowledge that 
one is not. But if one assumes that one knows one is not deceived, and wonders merely how one 
knows it, then one can form easy knowledge, according to Davies. Our examples can be re-cast in 
this latter form, and I still find the relevant inferences repugnant. 
4 This is not the technical notion Martin Davies (2009 § 9) calls “settling a question”. 
5 There is a general prohibition of coherence against: judging that p, and that p entails q, and 
suspending judgment on q. But when one must settle that q epistemically prior to settling that p, it 
is even worse to suspend judgment on q. One violates an epistemic priority requirement, as well 
as the more general coherence requirement. For example, it is worse than mere logical 
incoherence to suspend judgment on whether one will be permanently abducted by purple aliens 
tonight, and yet judge that one will teach tomorrow. 
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6 It is not the case that if one settles that p and that q, then one settles that p either epistemically 
prior or epistemically posterior to settling that q. One sometimes settles two questions 
epistemically independently, which entails that one does not settle either question prior to the 
other. Examples include settling by perception that one has hands, and that one has feet. § 6 
introduces a further kind of case: ones in which one settles that p and that q at the same point 
epistemically speaking. 
7 The terms “conservatism” and “liberalism” have been used in a variety of ways in the literature, 
surveyed by Neta (2010) and Tucker (2010). According to Pryor’s (2004) original definition, 
conservatism about perception says that for each “non-perceiving hypothesis”, one must settle 
that it does not obtain epistemically prior to settling questions by perception. The falsity of a non-
perceiving hypothesis (e.g., that one is dreaming) need not be entailed by what’s known by 
perception. So if we are focused on whether a view endorses easy knowledge, it is better to define 
conservatism in terms of skeptical alternatives. However, I think it is incoherent not to deny all 
non-perceiving hypotheses considered when one forms perceptual beliefs; so it would be is 
deeper to define conservatism in those terms, as Pryor does.  
8 This aspect of the case distinguishes my challenge from one considered by Cohen (2005, pp. 
422–4). Cohen considers the objection that the truth of KR does not prevent easy knowledge, as 
knowing that one’s faculty of perception is generally reliable does not put one in a position to 
know that one is not deceived on this particular occasion. By contrast, my example stipulates that 
Jonny is in a position to know that he is not deceived. 
9 Wright (2004 § II) explores restricting CK, saying that one only has “warrant to trust” that one 
is not a BIV, not “justification to believe” it. Wright accepts that what one is warranted in 
assenting to is closed under known entailment. 
10 Beware of reading into this label: it is controversial whether all cases of the phenomenon can 
be analogized to our apparent ignorance of whether a given ticket will win the lottery. 
11 Contextualists include Cohen (1999), DeRose (1996), and Lewis (1996). Hawthorne (2004, 
chapter 4) explores subject-sensitive invariantism without definitively endorsing it. MacFarlane 
(2014, chapter 8) defends truth-relativism about knowledge ascriptions. 
12 If a particular version of contextualism (say) cannot extend to shifts in whether there are 
defeating beliefs, then so much the worse for that particular theory. 
13 Another of White’s objections assumes that perceptual justification for p is always a matter of 
possessing the evidence that it appears to one that p. For example, Harry’s perceptual evidence is 
that the things look like hands. That rules out that the stranger has stumps, but should make Harry 
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more confident that she has prostheses (up from 1% to 1.01% confidence). So looking can’t 
increase Harry’s justification for thinking the stranger does not have prostheses. (Compare 
Hawthorne 2004, pp. 73–7; Cohen 2005, pp. 424–5; Wright 2007, p. 42; Silins 2008, § 3.3; Neta 
2010, § 5.) This objection begs the question, it seems to me. The most obvious version of 
liberalism says that one’s perceptual evidence sometimes includes such facts as that the things are 
hands. Pryor (2013, esp. §§ 5–6) explores this and other more recherché liberal responses; see 
also Weatherson (2007). 
14 Cohen (2005, pp. 424–5) seems to overlook the existence of lottery-resistant cases of easy 
knowledge. 
15 Pryor suggests that whether something is a hand is a basic content, but whether something is a 
police officer is a non-basic content (2000, pp. 538–9). I find this odd. On the view we will 
consider, one recognizes something as a hand on the basis of its size, shape, and color; so being a 
hand is a non-basic content. 
16 Officially, Siegel’s question is whether visual experience represents certain features (2010, p. 
7). She does not consider distinguishing ways in which a percept represents. 
17 This account may seem more plausible in light of the view of basing suggested in the previous 
endnote. One might identify the representation of phenomenal color with the phenomenology of 
color experience. There’s no assumption here that the representation of phenomenal color is 
determined by local retinal stimulation, with no color constancy whatsoever. An anonymous 
reviewer notes that bees represent colors without representing anything like phenomenal colors. 
So maybe the color vision of bees differs drastically from that of humans.  
18 Klein (2004) says two beliefs are “epistemically on a par” iff they are both supported by some 
third belief. I deny there need be such a third belief in cases of settling two questions at the same 
point epistemically speaking.  
19 Sosa’s (2009) proposal resembles coherentism more than it does my proposal. He says, “it must 
be recognized that…the mutual support [resulting from “easy knowledge” inferences] … might 
add something of epistemic value” (2009, p. 242, my emphasis; see also pp. 237–241). So he 
seems to endorse “easy knowledge” reasoning, whereas my proposal rejects it.  
20 Tucker (2010, § 3.1) agrees that “inefficient” easy knowledge inferences have the same status 
as “efficient” ones. He thinks both are legitimate, and I think neither is. 
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